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Abstract
The Quasigroup Block Cipher and its Analysis
Matthew J. Battey, MS
University of Nebraska, 2014
Advisor: Abhishek Parakh
This thesis discusses the Quasigroup Block Cipher (QGBC) and its analysis. We
rst present the basic form of the QGBC and then follow with improvements
in memory consumption and security. As a means of analyzing the system, we
utilize tools such as the NIST Statistical Test Suite, auto and crosscorrelation,
then linear and algebraic cryptanalysis. Finally, as we review the results of these
analyses, we propose improvements and suggest an algorithm suitable for low-cost
FPGA implementation.
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Matthew J. Battey
All rights reserved.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
Continuous research into novel cryptosystems is necessary, as past systems be-
come vulnerable due to increased computational power and cryptanalysis that
have identied weakness in existing systems[2][3]. For this reason, we propose
and demonstrate a novel cryptosystem based on quasigroup polyalphabetic sub-
stitution.
In this thesis, we will rst introduce the reader to quasigroups. Then in chap-
ter 2, we dene our Quasigroup Block Cipher (QGBC), which was specically
designed to overcome limitations from prior work[4]. Next in chapter 3, we dis-
cuss means for limiting the resources consumed by a quasigroup. From here, we
expand the QGBC and utilize it as a pseudo random number generator, in chap-
ter 4. Then in chapter 5 , we explore the cryptographic analysis of the QGBC.
Which nally leads us to chapter 6, where we identify improvements based on the
results of cryptanalysis, and further rene the memory requirements needed by
the system.
In this chapter we will formulate baseline knowledge of quasigroups, rst gain-
ing background in x 1.2. Then we explore prior work where quasigroups are used
in cryptography in x 1.3 and nally in x 1.4 we discuss the theoretical security of
the quasigroup.
21.1 Research Motivation and Goals
Discovery, research, and enhancement of cryptographic systems has proven to not
only be a curiosity but a necessity. History has shown that for every cryptographic
measure a counter measure has been found to disable it. In some cases, human
error and social engineering are the downfall, but in other cases cryptanalysis has
shown weaknesses in systems.
Many cryptosystems were designed prior to the advent of low-cost, low-power
computing equipment which are spawning the "Internet of Things." These devices
not only need to be protected from each other, but from main-line computing
system with much more processing capability and resources. While these systems
often have more processing power than large computer system from just a decade
ago, they often run on battery power, so the need for highly eective cryptographic
measures that require little power to accomplish is a future need.
Starting in 1994, the National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST)
rst proposed Secure Hash Algorithm #1 (SHA-1) as a means of random number
generation [5]. In 2004, NIST released a brief on SHA-1, noting that a weakened
variant of the system had been broken, and suggested that software vendors move
to newer alorithms[2]. In another case, RC4 one of the most commonly used
ciphers for secure internet trac has shown similar issues[3]. Further, the triple
DES cryptosystem has shown weaknesses to linear analysis[6].
For these reasons we set out with the following goals:
Develop a novel block cipher Block ciphers tend to be more reliable in dis-
tributed communication environments as well as provide additional security
Utilize standard key sizes Using standard keys allows us to re-use key ex-
change mechanisms and utilize current conventions.
Pass the NIST-STS suite NIST developed the Statistical Test Suite[7], which
combines a number of pre-dened statistical test to evaluate the entropy
generated by a crypto system.
3Based on these goals, we chose to enhance the Quasigroup Stream Cipher[8]
and use it as the basis for a new block cipher.
1.2 Background on Quasigroups
A Quasigroup is an algebraic structure similar to a group. However, a quasigroup
does not necessarily possess the axioms of identity and associativity; rather one
only requires closure and inversion. Quasigroups have been part of popular cul-
ture, making their way into games like Sudoku, where they are represented as
Latin squares. This thesis focuses on the quasigroup for two reasons, which are
important to cryptography. First, one closure and inversion make handy tools for
making cipher/decipher pairs, and secondly, the lack of associativity is the begin-
nings of a one-way function. The following list will be used as a guide describing
expressions throughout this thesis.
N { A quasigroup's order, or number of distinct elements
M { Plain text, information which is directly readable
Mi { A single word from the Plain text (sometimes called Message Text)
mi { A single bit form the Plain text
C { Cipher text, information which has been encrypted so that is is not plainly
readable
Cx { A single word from the Cipher text
ci { A single bit from the cipher text
K { Key text, a sequence of bits
Kx { A single word from the Key text
ki { A single bit from the key text
w { The size of a word in bits
jM j; jCj; jKj { The number of words in M , C, or K
Also for this thesis, we will denote  and  as the primary quasigroup op-
eration and its inverse. Table 1.1 is an example of a quasigroup order N = 4
rendered as a Latin square. For a given row or column, each element appears
only once; which alternately allows the quasigroup to be represented as a set of
ordered triples; such as the following, which describes the rst row in tbl. 1.1:
4f(0; 0; 2); (0; 1; 0); (0; 2; 3); (0; 3; 1); :::g. Membership in a quasigroup can also be
dened by a known mathematical operation, such as addition modulo N or bit-
wise exclusive-or.
0 1 2 3
0 2 0 3 1
1 3 2 1 0
2 0 1 2 3
3 1 3 0 2
Table 1.1: Sample quasigroup order N = 4
1.2.1 Quasigroup Computation
Computation of the quasigroup operation may be performed by a look-up from
the ordered triples set or Latin square. Say we wish to compute 2  3 using the
Latin square approach; we rst look in row 2 then column 3 and nd our answer
is 2  3 = 3 (the rst row and column are the 0'th). To perform 1  1, we look in
row 1 and nd the column containing 1. We see that 1 is found in column 2, thus
1  1 = 2. To reduce computation, it is possible to produce an equivalent inverse
quasigroup, which lets one use the row and column indices as in the forward
quasigroup.
1.2.2 Equivalent Classes of Latin Squares
Latin square equivalence classes [9] are those squares that are related by some
simple transformation. One example is to add 1 modulo N to every element. The
equivalence class we are interested in is one where we rearrange the members of
the ordered triple found in the orthogonal array representation, to from an inverse
quasigroup. Here, we transpose (ri; cj; vij) with (ri; vij; cj) of our Quasigroup. This
is a valid transposition producing an equivalent Quasigroup. We know this to be
true by the very nature of the Quasigroup's Latin square denition. Tables 1.2
and 1.3 are transpositions of each other.
Later in this thesis we make reference to the number of quasigroups, by count-
5ing the number of Latin squares (see x 1.4). These counts are given based on the
number of Reduced Latin squares possible for a given N . Here a special equiva-
lence class is used required, where whole columns and rows are swapped; such that
the rst row and column are sorted in ascending order. The remaining elements
can be present in any order as long as they conform to the properties of a Latin
square.
1.3 Quasigroups in Cryptography
The quasigroup operation allows us to make polyalphabetic substitutions, and
this property has been used in ciphers for more than four-hundred years. In
1585, Blaise de Vigenere constructed a Latin square of the same order as his
target language (i.e. N = 026 for English) [10]. He then proposed a key word
that would select the cipher text (or pad-text in today's language). This cipher
was considered unbreakable until 1863, when it was discovered that for a large
enough plain text the cipher text demonstrated repetitions. Although this cipher
received Vigenere namesake, Giovan Battista Bellaso had actually published the
cipher 1553.
The matrix used for one-time pad (OTP) is also a quasigroup, and is also
known as a bitwise exclusive-or (XOR). Frank Miller rst described this crypto-
graphic system in 1882 [11], then again by Gilbert Vernal in 1917 [12] [13], where
it was then patented. We know the OTP to have perfect security, as long as the
pad is of the same length as the plain text, random, uniform, and independent of
the input.
Within the last decade, further research has gone into the polyalphabetic sub-
stitution properties of quasigroups. Gligoroski and Markovski (G&M) report cryp-
tographic potentials of matrix quasigroups and suggest a stream cipher [4]. With
this system the quasigroup remains secret and is pre-shared between communica-
tion partners. A published seed word is combined with the rst word in the plain
text. Then subsequent plain text words are combined with the previous cipher
6text word. This stream cipher takes the form C0 = s M0; Ci = Ci 1 Mi; i  1,
which chains each output byte to the previous (we will see an expanded expla-
nation below, in x 1.3.1). The strength of security is based on the order of the
quasigroup selected; lending form the raw number of quasigroups to choose from.
Then with Kocarev, Gligoroski and Markovski explore the potentials of remov-
ing the bias from poor PRNG systems by utilizing a quasigroup stream cipher to
further randomize the data [14]. Here a weak random sequence generator such as
libC's random() passed through G&M's stream cipher, with the goal of improving
the data distribution of the driver. This method suers in statistical evaluation
however [15].
Satti and Kak envision a quasigroup cryptosystem for both data and speech
in their paper [8]. Their research applies G&M's stream cipher to a number
of practical inputs such as English text, constant values, and PCM audio data.
They demonstrate success through autocorrelation techniques as well as propose
systems for distribution of the quasigroup and implementation in communication
devices.
1.3.1 Quasigroup Stream Cipher Encryption
Consider the criticality of the equivalence of the base Quasigroup and its inverse.
The equations found in 1.1 construct the protocol for a Quasigroup based stream
cipher. Using the  operator, we can quickly and eciently re-encode plain text
to cipher text. Using the equivalent inverse Quasigroup, we can reverse that pro-
cess. We have constructed a encryption cipher with its corresponding decryption
function!
7 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 1 3 2 6 4 5
2 2 6 4 5 1 3
3 3 2 6 4 5 1
4 4 5 1 3 2 6
5 5 1 3 2 6 4
6 6 4 5 1 3 2
Table 1.2: A quasigroup of order 6.
Example 1: Table 1.2 presents a quasigroup of order 6. The left most column
and the top most row are index numbers. An initial seed element is chosen, say s =
3, and let the input data stream be represented by fM1;M2;M3;M4;M5;M6;M7;M8g
= f1; 5; 4; 2; 6; 4; 5; 3g. Then the encryption process produces an encrypted output
stream fC1; C2; C3; C4; C5; C6; C7; C8g as dened by Alg. 1.
Data: QG[][] { A two dimensional array containing the quasigorup
Data: S { The Seed
input : M { The Plain Text
output: C { The Cipher Text
C0 = QG[S][M0];
for i = 1tojM j do
Ci = QG[Ci 1][Mi];
end
Algorithm 1: Quasigroup Stream Cipher
8C1 = S M1 = 3  1 = 3
C2 = C1 M2 = 3  5 = 5
C3 = C2 M3 = 5  4 = 2
C4 = C3 M4 = 2  2 = 6
C5 = C4 M5 = 6  6 = 2
C6 = C5 M6 = 2  4 = 5
C7 = C6 M7 = 5  5 = 6
C8 = C7 M8 = 6  3 = 5
(1.1) Quasigroup Stream Cipher Example
Unrolling the algorithm, with the sample data, produces the operations show
in (1.1), when computed using tbl. 1.2.
1.3.2 Quasigroup Stream Cipher Decryption
For the decryption operation, an inverse quasigroup matrix is constructed (table
1.3). We construct the invQG[][] matrix, by doing the following: in the jth column
of the ith row in invQG[][] matrix write the column number of element j from the
ith row in QG[][]. Then to decrypt we perform the algorithm shown in Alg. 2.
 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 1 3 2 5 6 4
2 5 1 6 3 4 2
3 6 2 1 4 5 3
4 3 5 4 1 2 6
5 2 4 3 6 1 5
6 4 6 5 2 3 1
Table 1.3: Inverse for the quasigroup in Table 1.2
9Data: invQG[][] { A two dimensional array containing the inverse
quasigroup
Data: S { The Seed
input : M { The Plain Text
output: C { The Cipher Text
M0 = invQG[s][c0];
for i = 1tojCj do
Mi = invQG[Ci 1][Ci];
end
Algorithm 2: Quasigroup Stream Cipher Decryption
In general, the direct application of the above encryption algorithm is very
eective in randomizing the input data stream. However, given an input data
stream and its corresponding output data stream a known plain text attack can
be launched because QG[Ci 1][Mi] = Ci, which directly leads the attacker to
assess the quasigroup's denition. Consequently, qausigroups as stream ciphers
may provide only limited security, if ever the attacker were to gain knowledge of
the quasigroup itself.
1.4 On Theoretical Security of Quasigroup Ci-
phers
The total number of Latin squares of order N , N > 2, is given by LN = N !(N  
1)!TN , where TN denotes the number of reduced Latin squares of order n. The
numbers TN and LN increase very quickly with N [8]. Table 1.4 gives the number
of reduced Latin squares.
From table 1.5 we see that the number of possibilities for the Latin squares is
astronomical. Therefore, if the quasigroup is kept secret along with the 256 bit
key (32 random seeds) the system provides very good security.
10
N TN
2 1
3 1
4 4
5 56
6 9048
7 16942080
8 535281401585
9 377597570964258
10 7580721483160132811489280
11 5:36 1033
12 1:62 1044
13 2:51 1056
14 2:33 1070
15 1:50 1086
Table 1.4: Number of reduced Latin squares of order 2 to 15.
0:689 10138  LS(16)  0:101 10119
0:985 10785  LS(32)  0:414 10726
0:176 104169  LS(64)  0:133 104008
0:164 1021091  LS(128)  0:337 1020666
0:753 10102805  LS(256)  0:304 10101724
Table 1.5: Bounds for number of Latin squares for orders 16, 32, 64, 128 and 256.
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Chapter 2
Quasigroup Block Cipher
In this chapter we will examine the Quasigroup Block Cipher (QGBC) that was
designed as part of this research eort. We will rst cover the algorithm with out
Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) and the statistical analysis of the test implemen-
tation (see x 2.1). Then we will explore a modication that enables CBC and
outline the statistical analysis of the QGBC-CBC based test implementation (see
x 2.2).
2.1 Proposed Algorithm 1: Quasigroup Block
Cipher
Our goal is to make a quasigroup cipher similar in functionality to the popular
AES system. To this end, we use 32 dierent seeds for each round of encryption.
Utilizing multiple rounds of encryption, with dierent seeds in dierent rounds,
nesses the known-plain-text attack and provides a higher level of security; just
as in the case of Triple DES and AES. We choose 32 seeds, because we assume
that each seed is one byte in size and 32 bytes is quivalent to 256 bits, which is
the commonly used key length for AES systems.
In order to introduce dependencies between bytes of input data, we divide the
plain text into 128 bit (16 byte) blocks and encrypt each block separately using
Algorithm 3, below.
12
input : Cipher Key { 256 bits
input : Plain Text { A stream of 128 bit blocks
Result: Plain Text encoded as Cipher Text
Construct a 256x256 size quasigroup;
Generate a random 256 bit encryption key and divide it into 8 bit (1 byte)
blocks which will be used as seed elements at every round of encryption.
This results in 32, 1 byte, seeds;
Divide the source data into 128 bit (16 byte) blocks;
for Each block of Plain Text do
for Each 8-bit word in the Cipher Key do
Using the current block as a stream of 16, 8-bit integers, apply the
current 8-bit key as the quasigroup cipher seed and encrypt the
block;
Left shift the currently encrypted block by 1, 3, 5 or 7 bits
depending on the index of the current 8-bit key block modulo 4;
end
end
Algorithm 3: Quasigroup Block Cipher
Note that although each block is 128 bits long, when applying quasigroup
encryption we further divide the block into 16, 1 byte sub-block. Then we apply
algorithm 1 to the block once for each word in the Cipher Key. After every round
of encryption (application of the stream cipher), all the bits are taken together
and then left-rotated. A pseudo code is given below:
13
dene : BlockSize = 16
dene : KeySize = 32
input : PlainText { The entire plain text buer
input : Key { An Array length KeySize
output: CipherText { The enter cipher text buer
Data: QGMS { An Array(256,256)
Data: ShiftDistance as [1,3,5,7]
for each Block in PlainText do
CipherText = Block;
for each K in Key do
CipherText = QuasiGroupCipher(QGMS, K,CipherText)
CipherText = LeftShift(CipherText, ShiftDistance[Key.IndexOf(K)
Modulo 4])
end
Output[IndexOf(Block,Source)] = CipherText
end
Algorithm 4: Pseudo code algorithm for the QGBC
The shift distances of 1, 3, 5, and 7 are each relatively prime to 2 and thus to
8 (size of a word in this system). Their sum is 16 (size of 2 bytes) and if each shift
is applied 8 times, their sum becomes 128, which is equal to the block size of 128
bits (16 bytes) into which the input data was divided. Therefore, one full rotation
of block occurs with shifts of 1, 3, 5 and 7 when all the 32 seeds are used. This
ensures that all the bytes in the encrypted block become interdependent. Later,
in x 5.1, we will see that the shift distance is critically important.
Figure 2.1, below demonstrates this algorithm graphically. Here again, we
see the process of selecting a block performing the Quasigroup transformation,
bit-shifting, and repeating.
14
Figure 2.1: Flowchart for the quasigroup block cipher (proposed algorithm 1).
Here M is the entire message, M(j) is the jth block in the message, K is the key,
K(i) is the ith seed in the key string, jM j is the size of message in bytes, jKj is
the size of key string in bytes, i is the iterator of key bytes and j is the iterator
of message blocks.
2.1.1 Test Implementation
A test implementation was developed in C#.net, because of the popular adoption
of C# and the pre-existing AES cipher suite. Also, Microsoft Visual Studio 2010
has built in unit-testing facilities, which combined with Test-Driven-Development,
produced well-tested code in reduced increments of time. The test implementation
has the ability to overwrite the plaintext buer in place, limiting the memory
footprint required to encode a buer. Keys were generated using the random-
number generator, System.Random, allocating 16 random bytes per request. Full
n n Quasigroup matrices were constructed for both encryption and decryption
using the Knuth/ Fisher-Yates Shue [16]. Both the encryption and decryption
routines were constructed and tested.
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2.1.2 Statistical Analysis
We used the National Institute of Technology - Statistical Test Suite (NIST-STS)
suite to evaluate the randomness introduced by the system in the cipher. The
NIST-STS package gives a P-value and Success/Fail status for various standard-
ized tests. Based on the null hypothesis that the tested sequence is random. Thus,
the P-value is the probability that a perfect random number generator would have
produced a less random sequence than the one being tested [17].
Based on the research by the NIST-STS team, each test was given a P-value
threshold. When a P-value result from a test crossed these thresholds, the test
was considered successful, otherwise it is agged a failure. Control tests were
performed against the plain text source (it should be noted the control failed each
test). The NIST-STS test suite is available freely in C source code, and download-
able from http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/rng/index.html. The
tool can be congured to read a source le as a stream of bits, and evaluate the
randomness of that stream. We report the results for the following tests, where
the parameters used for the tests are given in table 2.1:
 Approximate Entropy (AE) - A test comparing all overlapping m-bit pat-
terns.
 Block Frequency (BF) - A test which evaluates the proportion of 1's inm-bit
blocks.
 Cumulative Sums, Forward (CSF), Reverse (CSR) - Evaluates whether the
maximal cumulative sum of partial sequences is outside the range for ex-
pected behavior of a random sequence.
 Discrete Fourier Transform (FFT) - Implemented as a Fast Fourier Trans-
form, detects repeating or periodic features that are near to each other.
 Frequency (FREQ) - Evaluates the frequency of 1's and 0's in the entire
sequence.
 Longest Run - Comparison of longest contiguous run of 1's in m-bit blocks
to expected frequency of same.
 Rank - The rank of disjoint sub-matrices within the entire sequence.
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 Runs - Finds and evaluates the longest sequence of contiguous 1's in the en-
tire sequence and compares the oscillation between 1's and 0's to a standard
frequency.
 Serial - Compares the frequency of all m-bit overlapping patterns in the full
sequence. Two variations are applied.
Block Frequency Test - block length(m) 128
Non-overlapping Template Test - block length(m) 9
Overlapping Template Test - block length(m) 9
Approximate Entropy Test - block length(m) 10
Serial Test - block length(m) 16
Linear Complexity Test - block length(m) 500
Table 2.1: Parameters for the NIST-STS test
Upon completion of each test, a P-value result is rendered. If a P-value for a
test is determined to be equal to 1 or 0 then an error condition has occured[17].
Otherwise, P-values greater 0.01 demonstrate the test was passed.
Initially 20 encrypted data sets each were produced, from input les containing
binary zero (0x00), binary ones (0xFF) and text from Aseop's fable, \From the
Goose and the Golden Eggs" for a total of 60 les.
Table 2.2 shows the P-values for the various tests. In the table the rst three
columns show the average P-values for all 60 les, ranking QGBC results against
AES results.. The rst column lists the various tests done, second column is the
average P-values for encryption of all three inputs using quasigroups, third column
is the average P-value for all three inputs using AES and the fourth column is the
ratio of the P-value of encryption using quasigroups to that using AES multiplied
by 100. The last four columns are P-values for all zero (0x00) and 0xFF inputs
alone.
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Test QGBC AES QG:AES 0x00-AES 0x00-QG 0xFF-AES 0xFF-QG
BF 0.57189 0.53593 106.71% 0.59109 0.57530 0.48253 0.64041
CS-F 0.47759 0.45340 105.33% 0.47739 0.42955 0.36766 0.50679
CS-R 0.47995 0.46111 104.08% 0.48052 0.43870 0.36949 0.49906
FFT 0.15798 0.15622 101.12% 0.03377 0.043198 0.05215 0.05501
FREQ 0.40314 0.40006 100.77% 0.38935 0.34988 0.29779 0.39156
LR 0.30803 0.29188 105.53% 0.24881 0.21313 0.17118 0.27998
Runs 0.40384 0.40136 100.62% 0.37347 0.37045 0.38143 0.35849
Table 2.2: The table shows average P-values (over 20 runs) for quasigroup encryp-
tion as compared to AES256 encryption system when the same encryption key is
used for both cryptosystems without Cipher-Block-Chaining (CBC). Each source
data set consists of 288 bytes of sample data.
2.1.3 On memory and computational requirements:
The nn matrix consumes 64 KB ram. Also, test implementation was developed
in such away that the input data could be directly overwritten, no additional
buers were required. As the solution is a block cipher, only one block must be
in memory at any given time.
Processing eciency is as follows; for each byte in the block, lookup the QG
re-encoded value from the matrix, then left shift the block. Table 2.3 lists the
number of operations necessary when encrypting data. The number of operations
to decrypt is similar.
Encrypt: one 2D array lookup 1 op
Left shift: two 64-bit left shift 2 ops
Total Ops 16 byte block: 3 16 48 ops
Total Ops 32 byte key: 48 32 1536 ops
Table 2.3: Operations necessary to encrypt a 16 bite block with a 32 byte key,
note left shift can be greatly reduced using integers wider than 8 bits.
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2.2 Proposed Algorithm 2: Quasigroup Block
Encryption with Cipher Block Chaining
When we compared the QGBC to the AES system, we were unable to collect data
for the Approximate Entropy and Serial tests. Thus to improve the performance
of QGBC in these tests, we extended algorithm 4 to include cipher block chaining
(CBC). Mathematically, CBC is written as:
C[0] := e(k;M [0] V )
C[i+ 1] := e(k;M [i+ 1] C[i])
Where, C[i]: an indexed cipher text block, M [i]: an indexed plain text block,
K: the cipher key (here seed), V : A random initialization vector, where jV j =
jC[i]j = jM [i]j, e(K;M): the encryption function, QGBC in this case.
2.2.1 Test Implementation
After implementing quasigroup block cipher with cipher block chaining, tests were
repeated 20 times using a 256 bit random key (32, 1 byte seeds) each time. The
resulting encrypted data was tested for randomness using the NIST-STS test suite,
using the same parameters as before.
Table 2.4 compares the average P-value results from the NIST-STS test suite.
The quasigroup block cipher with CBC produced larger P-values than AES256
with CBC in almost all cases.
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Test QG AES QG:AES 0x00:AES 0x00:QG 0xFF:AES 0xFF:QG
BF 0.48822 0.51274 95.22 0.52155 0.47478 0.50250 0.48499
CS-F 0.51939 0.50588 102.67 0.50527 0.49851 0.48968 0.48843
CS-R 0.52502 0.48904 107.36 0.49205 0.51126 0.47860 0.49353
FFT 0.50188 0.48532 103.41 0.46172 0.48304 0.49187 0.49118
FREQ 0.50190 0.47353 105.99 0.48847 0.47584 0.46486 0.48745
LR 0.50468 0.47228 106.86 0.47476 0.46822 0.46320 0.53736
Runs 0.54392 0.51232 106.17 0.53926 0.55004 0.51784 0.54467
Serial 1 0.53571 0.53584 99.98 0.53300 0.51054 0.54146 0.56533
Serial 2 0.51635 0.49246 104.85 0.49903 0.52310 0.47274 0.51659
Table 2.4: The table shows average P-values (over 20 runs) for quasigroup encryp-
tion as compared to AES256 encryption system when the same encryption key is
used for both cryptosystems with Cipher-Block-Chaining (CBC). Here data sets
were of a short variety, constructed from a sequence of 288 bytes.
One should noted that the variance of P-values between dierent test results
can be misleading. For this reason, the NIST-STS package provides a Success/ Fail
determination. Thus, a second evaluation of the AES and QGBC cryptosystems
(both in CBC mode) was also run. Here, source data sets of 295KB are encrypted
and then assessed by the STS.
One thousand (1000) encrypted data sets were produced from les consisting of
all binary zeros, all binary 0xFF's, all ASCII letter E's, and the Project Gutenberg
imprint of Beowulf [1]. Each of the 1000 runs used a unique 256 bit key and
initialization vector (IV), for a total of 1000 keys and IVs. With each of the
key/IV pairs, the four les were encrypted with AES-CBC and QGBC-CBC, for
a total of 8000 les.
The NIST-STS documentation tells us that when we evaluate the results we
must look at the proportion successful tests. The authors is suggested that the
condence interval for our test should be dened by:
p^ 3
r
p^(1  p^)
m
where p^ = 1    and m is the magnitude of the sample [7]. We generated m =
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1000 tests, and with the recommended  = 0:01, our condence interval is :99
3
q
^:99(:01)
1000
= :99  0:0094392 or in other words the proportion should lie above
0.9805670.
Table 2.5 compares the success rates for these assessments. Success rates of
AES and QGBC are comparable, both scoring in the 98 percentile or better,
indicating successful evaluation of both systems.
Test AES QGBC
0x00 E 0xFF Beowulf 0x00 E 0xFF Beowulf
AE 988 989 986 985 986 995 988 992
BF 992 990 994 991 991 991 986 991
CSF 990 993 990 994 988 992 996 992
CSR 994 989 991 994 986 994 994 994
FFT 990 988 989 986 984 981 990 980
FREQ 992 992 989 994 991 992 996 992
LR 991 987 991 989 990 988 987 991
Rank 989 989 996 989 994 995 982 995
Runs 994 988 993 991 987 993 989 993
Ser1 990 992 995 995 991 990 989 994
Ser2 986 993 990 987 984 993 991 988
Table 2.5: Successes per 1000 encryption tests. 295 KB of 0x00, `E', 0xFF, and
the text of Beowulf[1] were encrypted with 1000 dierent keys via the Quasigroup
Block Cipher and AES, both in CBC mode, to demonstrate the ability to produce
randomized data sets for long input data sequences.
2.2.2 Waveform Analysis
Another means of evaluation is to visually inspect the waveform of audio data.
Here one compares the initial audio wave form to that of an encrypted waveform.
The source [18] and the encrypted audio waveforms are plotted in Figures 2.2 and
2.3 respectively.
Both plots demonstrate the waveforms using the same bit-rate per unit on the
horizontal axis. As we can see the quasigroup encryption system is very good at
distributing the amplitude of the audio signal over the entire time domain.
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Figure 2.2: Plot of original input audio waveform
Figure 2.3: Plot of encrypted output audio waveform
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Chapter 3
Storage
Optimization:Low-Overhead
Quasigroup representation
Recalling that the number of quasigroups of a certain order is given by TN(N  
1)!N !, we must store the entire quasigroup in memory, either as a set of N2
ordered triples, or as a N N matrix. Neither of these is very attractive, from a
transmission standpoint, nor from a memory consumption standpoint if we were
to implement the algorithm in hardware. In this chapter we explore the Low-
Overhead Quasigroup substitution cipher and its savings.
3.1 Low-Overhead Quasigroup (LOQG)
First, let us consider some group G, containing N = jGj elements. To abstractly
identify members, we will assign each an ordinal from (0:::N   1). Next consider
the mathematical operation c  a + b mod N . In this operation we see that
the following axioms are met: closure, associativity, identity and invertibility.
Interestingly, this group also denes exclusive-or, when n = 2. The number of
combinations in this group (a; b) is N2 producing N results, a polyalphabetic
substitution system.
Next, let's consider the following quasigroup denition which makes use of H
an randomly ordered tuple, such that each Hi is distinct as in (3.1).
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H = (H0; H1; :::; Hn 1)
8 i; j 2 G; 8 Hi 2 G;
i = Hi < (i+ 1) = Hi+1;
i 6= j , Hi 6= Hj :
c  Hi +Hj mod N
(3.1) Low Overhead Quasigroup dened
Because H is randomly ordered, this quasigroup still remains closed and in-
vertible, but has lost identity and associativity. The total number of permutations
for this model is equal to the total possible permutations of H, jHj! = N !.
Now, let us expand this model further by considering I also as an ordered
tuple, identical to H in all characteristics save it is shued in another manner.
Thus
c  Hi + Ij mod N
remains closed and invertible, but the total number of permutations has increased
by a factor of the permutations of I, jIj! = N !, giving the total number of permu-
tations as (N !)2.
3.2 Defense of the LO-QG
A quasigroup matrix of order N requires the storage of a matrix of size N N . If
we consider each element to be one byte in size (N=256) then the matrix required
is of size 256x256, resulting in a storage requirement of 64 KB or N2 elements.
In order to reduce the amount of storage, we take the advantage of the fact that
if we set vij = xi + yj mod N , then a matrix preserves the quasigroup structure;
where xi and yj are row and column indices, respectively, and vij is the value in
the cell denoted by row yi and column xj. Now, one could shue the columns and
rows using Fisher-Yates[16] shuing algorithm to generate a random quasigroup.
In essence, if we were to use the initial identity vij = xi + yj mod N and only
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store the shued states of the indices of rows and columns then we can reduce
the storage requirement to 2N from N2, which is a savings of O(N2).
This comes at the cost that total number of quasigroups that can be created
by shuing of rows and columns is (N !)2 (which is less than N !(N   1)!TN as
TN > N;8 N > 4). However, for all practical purposes for our implementation
this gives (256!)2 possibilities for the quasigroup, which is very large and still
provides practical security.
Table 3.1 is the initial starting matrix given by the identity vij = xi + yj
mod n. Table 3.2 shows a randomly shued state of the quasigroup matrix in
table 3.1. The top row and the left most column are the row and column indices
of the matrix. Table 3.2 shows the shued state of the indices from table 3.1.
Our storage savings arise from the fact that we can store only the initial identity
equation and the 2n shued indices for the entire quasigroup.
 0 1 2 3 4 5
0 0 1 2 3 4 5
1 1 2 3 4 5 0
2 2 3 4 5 0 1
3 3 4 5 0 1 2
4 4 5 0 1 2 3
5 5 0 1 2 3 4
Table 3.1: A un-shued quasigroup corresponding to vij  xi + yj mod n
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 2 0 5 4 3 1
4 0 4 3 2 1 5
1 3 1 0 5 4 2
3 5 3 2 1 0 4
5 1 5 4 3 2 0
0 2 0 5 4 3 1
2 4 2 1 0 5 3
Table 3.2: A shued quasigroup resulting from xi and yj having been shued.
Note that while the values within the Quasigroup still conform to the vij  xi+yj
mod n, but have lost the regularity of the un-shued reduced Quasigroup.
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Chapter 4
Quasigroup Pseudo Random
Number Generator
Pseudo random number generators (PRNGs) are essential to almost all digital
systems. Random numbers are useful in games of chance: shuing cards, altering
the behavior of video game \enemies", etc. as well as for secure communica-
tions. PRNGs are deployed for creating digital signatures [19] [20], eliminating
network congestion [21] [22], securing RFID communication [23] and facilitating
cryptographic measures for key generation and even implementing stream ciphers.
Unlike a true random number generator, PRNGs are dened by an algorithm.
The US Government, through the National Institute of Standards and Tech-
nology (NIST), is tasked with researching and recommending random number
generators for use in governmental operations. The most recent recommendation
is based on SHA-1, a hashing feedback algorithm [5]. However, the security of
SHA-1 has been broken (theoretically), and NIST has recommended the move to
another platform [2]. Although not implemented in major cryptographic suites,
for the purpose of random number generation, NIST has identied SHA-2 and
more recently SHA-3 successors to SHA-1 [5][24]. Similarly, ARC4 is used in
many mobile devices, and it to has proven to be insecure [3].
Modern operating systems and development platforms oer PRNG algorithms
as an included service. A survey reveals that Java and OpenSSL both implement
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the SHA-1 PRNG [25] [26] [27]; Microsoft.NET used SHA-1 prior to Windows 6.0
(Vista), but switched to an AES variant afterwards [28]; and Apple's MacOS and
iOS devices rely on ARC4Random [29]. Software vendors tend to default to US
government recommendations as a baseline for cryptographic tools.
In this chapter we review the use of the QGBC as a pseudo random number
generator (PRNG). Additional we demonstrate an updated version of the QGBC
(see x 4.1), which prevents attackers from playing the QGBC algorithm in reverse
if the quasigroup is known. This also moves the QGBC algorithm further from
keeping the quasigroup secred. Further, as we consider the QGBC as a PRNG,
we will focus on the Low Overheade QGBC (LO-QGBC).
4.1 Updated Quasigroup Block Cipher
Central to the proposed PRNG is the Quasigroup Block Cipher, which we have
redened as follows:
C1 := Ki  (Ki M1)
8 j 2 f2; 3; :::; 16g;
Cj := Cj 1  (Mj 1 Mj)
(4.1) Improved QGBC
Let C represent 128 bits cipher text (Cn a single byte in C), M 128 bits of
plain text (Mn a single byte fromM), Ki a key byte,  is the quasigroup operation
and  is a bit-wise exclusive-or (XOR). Notice that we have added the additional
XOR operation in an attempt to prevent an attacker from playing the algorithm
in reverse if the quasigroup is known.
This algorithm is an improvement of the G&M stream cipher[4], as it allows
us to publish the quasigroup. For instance, if the quasigroup were publicly know
for the G&M stream cipher, an attacker could take any Cj and Cj 1 and compute
Mj, eectively recovering the plain text by replaying the algorithm in reverse. In
the improved algorithm each Cj is dependent not just on Cj 1 and Mj but Mj 1
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as well. This prevents reverse auto-decryption, requiring the knowledge of a fully
decrypted word to decrypt the following word. As we are using the LO-QGBC the
remainder of the algorithm is shown in algorithm 4 but uses the LO-QG cipher
substitution from algorithm 5.
Data: H,I { LO-QG randomly ordered tuples
input : s { a single word from the Key
input : M { A block of plain text
output: C { A block of cipher text
C0 = Hs + IM0 mod N ;
for i = 1tojM j   1 do
Ci = HCi 1 + IMi mod N ;
end
Algorithm 5: The LO-QG cipher
Figure 4.1, a S-P block diagram, depicts the one step in multi-byte key appli-
cation of the block cipher. In this diagram, the S blocks represent the quasigroup
 operation and the P block represents the bit rotation. An additional block, the
 block, represents the exclusive-or substitution block.
Figure 4.1: Block Diagram: Multi-byte Key Quasigroup Block Cipher w/o cipher
block chaining
Provided to demonstrate the QGBC graphically, g 4.1 depicts how the 128
bit plain-text message block M is subdivided into 16 equal size 8-bit bytes.In the
diagram we see that each of message byte is combined with the previous message
byte ( block), and then polyalphabetically substituted (S-block) with either the
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previous cipher text Cj 1 or the key Ki. Then in the P-block, the entire Ci0
sequence is rotated to become Ci, nally becoming C after the all bytes in K.
The diagram does not depict the looping behavior post P-block. Instead, the
cipher text C would be passed into an identical S-P network, along with the next
Ki.
4.2 Feedback Generator
The quasigroup block cipher allows us to generate 128 random bits at a time.
To generate more, we must construct a mechanism which is self-sustaining and
statistically random. For this case, we deploy a feedback generator. The following
steps occur in such a mechanism:
Select a random initialization vector (V );
Select a random key K;
Select a plain text (M);
Calculate O1 = QGBC(V  M;K) and report as rst 128 bits;
for 8 i > 0; i 2 Z do
Oxi = QG(Ox 1  M;K);
Report as ith 128 bits;
end
Algorithm 6: QGBC PRNG Feedback Generator
Here QGBC(M;K) is the multi-byte quasigroup block cipher. This algorithm
is depicted in gure 4.2. This feedback generator takes a random seed and initial-
ization vector, and is self-sustaining from this point on.
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Figure 4.2: Block Diagram: Feedback Generator for self sustaining PRNG
Figure 4.2 demonstrates the process of feeding back the previously generated
random sequence Ox 1, while cipher-block-chaining it to the input M . To limit
the amount of data required to seed our QGBC-PRNG system, we can choose
M = (K0; K1; :::; K15) and V = (K16; K17; :::; K31).
Nowadays, 256 bits of random data are simple to come by. We can use SHA-
256 [5] as a source method to combine information such as the current time in
seconds, and other data from the source system, like MAC addresses, memory
consumption, TCP/IP address, etc. For the best hash possible, one should acquire
at least 256 bits of source data.
4.3 Processing Time
First let us consider the cost in operations for the LO-QGBC, in this case modeling
a modern CPU with a random-access memory. We will dene the following costs:
M { Cost of memory retrieval
O { Cost of single byte  and 
R { Cost of 128-bit rotation (p(C; x))
O { Cost of 128-bit 
Modern processors can calculate m = a + b mod 256 in a single step, for this
reason we consider  and  to have equivalent cost. Thus recurrence for the
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quasigroup block cipher is given as:
T (q(K;M)) = 2jKjjM j(M +O) +R
Substituting jKj = 32; jM j = 16 we see:
T (q(K;M)) = 210(M +O) +R
Now let us consider the feedback generator that incorporates cipher block
chaining, thus the recurrence for each output block C becomes:
T (q(K;M)) = 2jKjjM j(M +O) +R +O
= 210(M +O) +R +O
As one may see, the time to produce each C is xed, giving T (C = q(K;M)) =
O(c). Further the recurrence to produce m bits is:
T (C)m
8jCj = O(
cm
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) = O(c0m) = O(m)
4.4 Evaluation
Common practice has the researcher compare the output of one PRNG to other
well established PRNG systems. Again, we will use the NIST-STS this purpose.
Each of the STS tests focuses on a dierent aspect of randomness through out
the input sequence. Weighing any one test over the others could be a mistake,
instead, some balance between the evaluations should be sought. The STS team
points to the reason for this: First, they identify a Type I error (denoted as ,
also known as the level of signicance for a given test. The team chose P-values of
0.01 as signicant for cryptographic work. Second, are Type II errors which they
denote as .  errors occur when a sequence is falsely identied as random, and
there is no xed value for this. One approach to reducing  errors is to elevate
the signicance of , another is to increase the breadth of testing [30] [17].
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4.4.1 Evaluation Process
Preparation for evaluation QGBC-PRNG involved selecting a set of well estab-
lished PRNG systems. For comparison, we chose arc4random from Free BSD/MacOS
X [29], Microsoft.Net's RandomNumberGenerator [31], OpenSSL RAND [27], and
Java's SecureRandom [26]. These PRNG systems were chosen because each is well
accepted by industry, including all major modern OS platforms (MacOS X, Linux,
Windows, and Java). Further, RAND and SecureRandom are both implemented
to conform with FIPS 180-4 [5], in which the NIST has specied the minimum
requirements, for secure random number generation in US government cryptosys-
tems. It should be noted that the system function, RandomNumberGenerator,
was called on a system running Windows 7, and therefore utilized an AES based
PRNG, instead of the SHA-1 system utilized in Microsoft systems prior to Mi-
crosoft Vista [28].
For each of the ve PRNGs, we generated one-thousand (1000) sequences
of random data, each containing 512 kilobytes (222 bits). For each of these ve-
thousand les, we generated unique random seeds, so that each run would produce
a unique sequence of data.
After generating the random outputs, each le was passed through the NIST-
STS system. Here again, we used the same settings that were used when testing
the QGBC as cipher (see tbl. 2.1).
4.4.2 Evaluation Results
We have captured the success rate of each of the ve PRNG systems tested in
Table 4.1. QGBC-PRNG performs in the 99th percentile for all of the tests evalu-
ated. Just as the STS performs statistical tests, the results should be considered
statistically as well [17].
Any system testing in this range 980-1000 is considered \acceptably random",
based on the condence interval identied by the NIST team[17]. Review of
the test results showed that the commercially available PRNG systems pass the
NIST-STS test suite as well, which should be expected, as these systems have been
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QGBC-PRNG ARC4 OSSL Java MS.Net
AE 990 986 987 990 991
BF 990 993 988 993 997
CSF 985 990 985 988 989
CSR 987 993 987 986 989
FFT 993 985 983 988 987
FREQ 986 989 985 990 990
LR 995 987 995 989 994
Rank 994 988 992 992 989
Runs 986 986 995 991 990
Ser1 990 984 988 988 989
Ser2 988 984 988 985 993
Table 4.1: NIST-STS Test Success Rates for 1000 Samples
vetted through rigorous use. Therefore, it should be noted that even though the
RC4 and SHA-1 based systems have been broken, they are still capable of passing
the statistical tests. Additional inspection is required to demonstrate strength
(see Security below). Also, cryptoanalysis of the QGBC/QGBC-PRNG should be
performed, and appears in chapter 5.
4.5 Autocorrelation
Autocorrelation proves to be another successful examination of the randomness
of a sequence. Like the Cumulative Sums test from the NIST-STS suite, auto-
correlation works best when we evaluate adjusted bits (i.e. 0 transforms to -1).
While performing the evaluation, we may observe any adjusted sequence S. Thus
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autocorrelation may be dened by the following:
n = jSj
1  i  n :ri =
iX
j=1
Sj + Sn j
n+ 1  i  2n :ri =
n iX
j=1
Sj + Sj+(i n)
Autocorrelation procedure produces 2n data points. To examine randomness, we
should consider the ratio between the number of data points n = jSj and each
correlation ri. We examine the autocorrelation results for 2
13 bits from QGBC-
PRNG output (g. 4.3a), PCM data from sample audio le (g. 4.3b) [18], a
cross correlation between two QGBC-PRNG outputs (g. 4.3d), and an OTP
encryption of the sample audio using the QGBC-PRNG output as the pad (g.
4.3c).
Examination of an autocorrelation plot should show a single spike at n, where
the sequence is directly correlated with itself. Peaks other than the n-spike indi-
cate higher degrees of correlation showing repeating patterns, and is expected.
Our results show that the QGBC-PRNG output (g. 4.3a) has a plot of a
random data set. Meanwhile, sample audio PCM data does not (g. 4.3b), and
shows higher degrees of correlation based on locality. However, once we apply an
OTP encryption to the sample audio, with the QGBC-PRNG output, we see that
this sequence now matches the expected pattern for random data. This would
suggest that we have inserted entropy into the audio sequence, providing for an
acceptable encryption.
Finally, we should consider cross-correlation between outputs from the QGBC-
PRNG with dierent seeding. Whenever an OTP encryption is applied, it is es-
sential to use very dierent random sequences for each encryption application.
This is an issue particular to OTP cryptosystems, as comparisons between runs
with identical pads, will render both the pad and plain text. Figure 4.3d shows
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(a) QGBC-PRNG Output (b) Sample Audio PCM Data
(c) Encrypted Audio (d) Cross-Correlation
Figure 4.3: Autocorrelation Plots
that the cross-correlation between two QGBC-PRNG output has very low corre-
lation, and shows no n-spike, which is also to be expected, given the two sets do
not correlate.
4.6 Security of QGBC-PRNG
Let us consider 8-bit words (n = 256), and a 32 word (256 bit) key (k = jKj = 32)
as input to a quasigroup block cipher. The probability of correctly selecting Mj
given Cj 1 and Cj is greater than or equal to 1 : 216. Also, the probability of
correctly selecting M1;M2; :::Mj is given C1; C2; :::; Cj is greater than or equal to
1 : 216(j 1). Further, using bit rotation (found in the QGBC cipher) and multiple
Ki applications, guarantees that the probability of correctly selecting any one byte
in the sequence to be 1 : 216(j 1). With a block size of 16 bytes, j = 16, thus the
probability is greater 1 : 2240 for correctly selecting the sequence.
When cipher block chaining is used (as in the case of the feedback generator),
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the probability of correctly selecting a sequence of l blocks is greater than 1 :
216(j 1)l, thus an output sequence of 32 bytes has a probability of 1 : 2480, a
sequence of 64 bytes, 1 : 2960, and so forth. This leads us to conclude that an
attacer would rather attempt to attack the input seed which has 256 bits. We can
conclude that the QGBC-PRNG maximal strength is 2256, making it key ecient.
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Chapter 5
Cryptanalysis of the QGBC
Vetting of a cryptosystem requires review through multiple forms of analysis.
In this chapter, we attack the QGBC through Linear Crypt Analysis x 5.1 and
then through Algebraic Analysis x 5.3. Through these means we identify several
problems with the QGBC system and then propose solutions to eliminate these.
5.1 Linear Cryptanalysis
Linear cryptanalysis examines relationships between plain text and cipher text,
with the goal of determining ane approximations of the cipher [32]. First iden-
tied as a method to assess the FEAL cipher by Matsui and Yamagishi [33] and
later applied to the DES cipher [6]; linear cryptanalysis uses the probability of
linear combinations of message and cipher text to attack individual rounds and
by extension the cipher as a whole.
When we apply a linear cryptanalysis, we compute the probability of every
combination of input M and output C bits, for every possible input M and key
K. For simplicity, let us consider n = jM j = jCj and jKj = k, which represent the
size in bits of M , C, and K. The number of linear combinations from M and C is
then 22n   2n+1, while the number of inputs M and K is 2nk. Overall we see the
complexity of exhaustively performing a linear analysis would be O(2kn
2
). Based
on the exponential nature of the tabulation, the analyst must limit his/her scope
to some portion of the cipher and then develop a strategy to attack the cipher as
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a whole.
As a straw man let us consider an order 4 substitution matrix such as the one
shown in :
0 1 2 3
0 2 3 0 1
1 0 1 2 3
2 1 2 0 3
3 0 1 3 2
Table 5.1: Substitution matrix with odd-bit bias
If we consider c0  m0 = 0 (least order bits of C and M) we see it has p = 34 ;
clearly demonstrating a bias on the odd bit. With this knowledge, the analyst
can pass along probability to subsequent passes, tracking the actions on the bit
and formulate an overall approximation[32].
5.2 Linear Cryptanalysis of QGBC
When we apply linear cryptanalysis to the QGBC cipher, we will use it to help
identify minima for the cipher's order. To this end, we construct linear combina-
tions of plain text bits and cipher text bits. Although the past implementations
of QGBC used 128 bit blocks with 256 bit keys, and quasigroups of order 256,
the number of linear combinations is beyond the grasp of our available computa-
tional power, as this would require reviewing (2256  2128) linear combinations for
each of the 2384 results, or (2640   2512) comparisons! For this reason we we will
review straw-man versions of the QGBC to review the eect of alterations to S()
and P (), by varying the quasigroup choice and rotational distance. We've used a
shorthand to describe the quasigroup being evaluated.
In the following sections we will explore seven experiments. The 1st experiment
(exp.) will be a quasigroup order 2, the 2nd a quasigroup dened by addition
modulo 4, the 3rd and 4th { quasigroups order 4 that have been randomized and
shifted by two bits, the 5th uses addition modulo 4 but rotations that are not
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two bits in distance, the 6th uses the quasigroup from experiment 4 but shifts
by distances other than two bits and nally in the 7th experiment, we examine a
single round of a quasigroup order 16.
5.2.1 Exp. 1: QG order 2
We begin analysis with a divide and conquer approach [32]. Hence, rst consider
a trivial QGBC cipher, with the following conditions:
 N = 2
 jM j = 4
 Single round of the substitution function S()
0 1
0 0 1
1 1 0
Table 5.2: Quasigroup N = 2, similar to exclusive-or
Since the quasigroup is order is N = 2, the size of each word is a single bit
( jM jjlog2N j =1). We are able to perform an exhaustive examination, capturing all K,
M and C. Next we count the the linear combinations of plaintext and ciphertext
bits which \sum" to zero. We see that certain combinations have probability
p = 1, while the remainder have probability p = 1
2
. The combinations with high
probability are shown in (5.1).
8i; j 2 (0; 1; 2; 3); i 6= j;
ci  cj mi mj = 0; p = 1
c0  c1  c2  c3 m0 m1 m2 m3 = 0; p = 1
(5.1) High probability linear combinations for N = 2 QGBC
The results show that if we consider a pair of any two input bits, with the
corresponding output bits, these form a balanced linear combination, in all cases.
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From this we interpret this to be a trivially weak cryptosystem [32]. We will
investigate the cause of this later in the thesis, via algebraic analysis.
5.2.2 Exp. 2: Addition Modulo 4, shift 2
Next, we will examine a QGBC system of order 4. Here each word is now rep-
resented with two bits. Consequently +(mod4) (denotes addition mod 4) is not
identical to bitwise  as was the case with N = 2 QGBC.
 N = 4; jKj = 8; jM j = 8; w = 4
 P (C; 2) performs a left shift by a whole word (2 bits)
 4 rounds of the S() and P () functions
 Quasigroup is dened by +(mod N) seen in table 5.3
Through an exhaustive comparison of all K, M and C for this system, tabula-
tions show that an \odd bit" problem appears. In every message word, there is an
independent, 1:1 correlation (p = 1) of low order bits in the corresponding cipher-
text word. The \odd bit" issue occurs because there is always an even number of
additions applied to each word, causing the low-order bit to never uctuate.
0 1 2 3
0 0 1 2 3
1 1 2 3 0
2 2 3 0 1
3 3 0 1 2
Table 5.3: Quasigroup order N = 4, dened by +(mod N)
5.2.3 Exp. 3: Randomized QG `A', shift 2
For this sampling, we again perform an exhaustive combination of all K, M , and
C, but this time, the quasigroup is not dened by +(mod N) but by a randomized
Latin square, which does not reduce to +(mod N) [34][35], and is dened by the
Latin square specied in table 5.4.
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 N = 4; jKj = 8; jM j = 8; w = 4
 P (C; 2) performs a left shift by a whole word (2 bits)
 4 rounds of the S() and P () functions
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 0 3
1 2 1 3 0
2 0 3 1 2
3 3 0 2 1
Table 5.4: Quasigroup with poor linear analysis performance
We see that this conguration also fails linear analysis based on the high
probability linear combinations, for brevity, three of which shown in (5.2).
m0 m1 m3 m5 m7  c2 = 0
m1 m2 m4 m6  c2  c3 = 0
m1 m5 m6  c1  c5  c6 = 0
(5.2) p = 1 Combinations for N = 4; QG! +(mod N)randomized
5.2.4 Exp. 4: Randomized QG `B', shift 2
Like Example A, Example B uses a randomized quasigroup that does not reduce
to +(mod n), but is dened by table 5.5.
 N = 4; jKj = 8; jM j = 8; w = 4
 P (C; 2) performs a left shift by a whole word (2 bits)
 4 rounds of the S() and P () functions
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 0 3
1 2 3 1 0
2 0 1 3 2
3 3 0 2 1
Table 5.5: Quasigroup with improved linear analysis performance
This conguration resulted in 24,954 linear combinations with p = 1
2
, a maxi-
mum p = 5
8
and a minimum p = 3
8
and average p = 0:5 0:0058.
5.2.5 Exp. 5: Addition modulo 4, shift 6= 2
In this conguration, we once again use a quasigroup based equivalent to +(mod N),
but to counter the \odd-bit" problem, we perform the sequence S(); P (C; 1); S(); P (C; 3); S();
P (C; 3); S().
 N = 4; k = 8; jM j = 8; w = 4
 P (C; r); r = 1; 3; 3 performs a left shift by 1 then 3 then 3 again
 4 rounds of the S() and P () functions
This solution completely eradicated the \odd-bit" problem as well as removing
all p = 1/p = 0 linear combinations. Instead we nd that 55,511 of 216 linear
combinations have p = 1
2
. Of the remainder the average probability is p = 0:5 
0:0138 with a maximum of p = 0:0688 and 0:344.
5.2.6 Exp. 6: QG `B', shift 6= 2
For this experiment we revisited the Example B Latin square, but this time used
the 1-3-3 rotation pattern used in the previous example. The following are the
conguration data:
 N = 4; k = 8; jM j = 8; w = 4
 P (C; r); r = 1; 3; 3 performs a left shift by 1 then 3 then 3 again
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 4 rounds of the S() and P () functions
 Quasigroup dened in tbl. 5.5
In this case we discovered 50,798 linear combinations had p = 1
2
, the minimum
probability p = 3
8
and a maximum probability of p = 0:563 and an average
p = 0:50:0101. From these results we conclude, in conjunction with identication
of the \odd bit" problem, we can see that P () should not rotate on the word
boundary.
5.2.7 Exp 7. QG Addition modulo 16
In the nal exhaustive linear analysis experiment, we evaluate an +(mod N); N =
16 quasigroup. Because of the limitation of processing capabilities, we use a block
of 8 bits, but now with only two words.
 N = 16; k = 8; jM j = 8; w = 2
 Single round of S()
We see that a single linear combination m0 m4  c0  c4 = 0 has p = 1, i.e.
suers the \odd bit" problem. We can speculate that with P () steps that rotate
by less than a whole word will remove this issue. With this experiment concluding
the linear analysis, let us now look to algebraic analysis of the QGBC.
5.3 Algebraic Cryptanalysis
Algebraic cryptanalysis allows us to examine the QGBC algorithm directly, iden-
tifying possible defects introduced by the mathematical interaction. We will ex-
amine the N = 2 quasigroup and also larger order quasigroups which have four
words per block.
5.3.1 Algebraic Analysis QGBC N = 2
Algebraic analysis of the QGBC system can lead us to an understanding of the
high probability of a linear combination found using exhaustive linear analysis.
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Let us rst consider QGBC order 2. Here S becomes a bitwise XOR or Not XOR,
for simplicity we will consider:
v = w
S(C;M;K; i) :
c0 = ki  (m1  kw i 1)
81  j < w : cj = cj   1 (mj 1 mj)
Previously, there was an assumption that  was neither associative nor dis-
tributive over . However, we know that  is associative. Thus if we expanded
S() we see:
k0 = k0  k1  : : : kn 1
80  j < w : cj = k0 mj
This would indicate that we have introduced a single bit of randomness in the
system, hence the system is trivially weak.
5.3.2 Algebraic Analysis QGBC N > 2
As long as a QGBC system is of order greater than 2 and the quasigroup does
not reduce to a bitwise XOR group, we can assume that  is not distributive over
 . Thus, let us consider a worst case scenario, where there are 4 words in the
key and 4 words in the block (this could represent four 64-bit words, for 256 bits
in the key and block, or our four 2-bit words for an 8 bit block form before). To
further review a worst-case, consider that each word in the plain text is the same
and represented by the term a. With these conditions, the cipher collapses to the
following:
Note: each additional apostrophe indicates an additional round of the cipher;
since there are four words in the key, four rounds are applied. From this, we can
infer some characteristics about our key. Specically that the following hold true
(see (5.4)), else an input of a = 0 would result in a trivially simple cipher.
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8 0  j < 4;mj = a :
cj = k0  (k3  a)
c0j = k1  (k2  P (k0  (k3  a)))
c00j = k2  (k1  P (k1  (k2  P (k0  (k3  a))))
c000j = k3  (k0  P (k2  (k1
P (k1  (k2  P (k0  (k3  a)))))
(5.3) Expansion of the QGBC block cipher
k2 6= P (k0  k3)
k1 6= P (k1  (k2  P (k0  k3)))
k0 6= P (k2  (k1  P (k1  (k2  P (k0  k3)))
(5.4) Inequalities to strengthen QGBC
Further observation shows an \identical word" problem that appears when the
words of M are identical to the words of C are also identical. This would be an
obvious attack on the cipher, and point to a plain text attack based on such a
construction. Thus the ability to attack the cipher would remain on the strength
of the problem described by c000j .
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Chapter 6
Improving the QGBC
Now that we have identied issues such as the \identical word" problem, we should
suggest alternatives that solve this. In section x 6.1, below, we do just this. Also
we extend this improvement and suggest a high-performance variant of the QGBC
suitable for FPGA implementation in x 6.1.1.
6.1 Improvement of the QGBC
If we make a change to the QGBC cipher we see that we can counter the \iden-
tical word" problem. Consider a construction such as show in (6.1). With this
conguration we se a single pass improvement in shown in (6.2).
S(C;M;K; i) :
C0 = K(jKj 1)  (Ki M0)
8 1  j < jM j : Cj = K(jKj 1 j mod jKj)  (Cj 1 Mj)
(6.1) Improved QGBC Substitution Function
The rst round (C 0i) shown in (6.2) shows that we have eliminated the \iden-
tical word" problem, and additionally, we have introduced more of the key into
each pass of the cipher. Reviewing the expression for C 02, we see that we have
introduced 2k bits of the key (or their inverse) into the calculation, which in sub-
sequence rounds aects every bit in the block. In fact, by round 2 (C 000 ) we have
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C 00 = K3  (K0  A)
C 01 = K2  ((K3  (K0  A))  A)
C 02 = K1  ((K2  ((K3  (K0  A))  A))  A)
C 03 = K0  ((K1  ((K2
((K3  (K0  A))  A))  A))  A)
C 000 = K3  (K1  C 01)
= K3  (K1  (K2  ((K3  (K0  A))  A)))
:::
(6.2) Single pass of improved QGBC w/ full-word rotation distance
successfully integrated bits (or their inverse) from every word in the key into every
word of the cipher text.
6.1.1 Application of the Improved QGBC
Although the improved QGBC substitution function 6.1 may be applied in general,
a special case is particularly interesting, where the QGBC is implemented in Field
Programable Gate Array (FPGA) hardware. While some FPGAs possess memory
components [36], buers large enough to hold 64 KB[37][15] typically require o-
chip memory to keep the unit price under $5.00US[38]. The low-overhead QGBC
(LO-QGBC) [39] provides an alternative, the number of clock cycles to implement
the algorithm, as-is, is not competitive with AES in terms of clock-cycles per
encrypted block [40][41].
Instead, consider the improved QGBC in a high-performance conguration
(QGBC-HP), with the following parameters:
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Quasigroup Order N = 264
Quasigroup Denition Addition Modulo N
Key Size 256 bits
Block Size 256 bits
Words per Block 4
Number of Rounds 4
S(C;M;K; i) :
C0 = K(jKj 1)  (Ki +M0)
8 1  j < jM j : Cj = K(jKj 1 i mod jKj)  (Cj 1 +Mj)
(6.3) QGBC-HP Substitution function
With this we can express S() as in (6.3). The entire cipher is pictured via
block diagram in g. 6.1, where P57 a 57 bit left rotation and P83 indicates an 83
bit left rotation. The rst S block is expanded to show the internals, and each
subsequent S block is identical.
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Figure 6.1: QGBC-HP Cipher Network
With this specication, an FPGA solution requires a total of 512 bits of mem-
ory divided into two register banks, K (Key, 256 Bits) and A (Accumulator, 256
bits, receives the initialization block(IV) as well as Message text), a 64-Bit Adder,
64-Bit XOR, M -Bit XOR (for use in loading the Accumulator, assuming the data
bus is M bits wide and less than 64 and is a divisor of 256), inversion and shift
logic. Each round may be accomplished in 4 clock cycles (executing the XOR
and Addition in a single clock) followed by a single clock to rotate bits. The core
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processing for the QGBC-HP algorithm can be performed in 19 clocks, plus the
overhead of read-in/read-out. The algorithm for this process is show in Algorithm
7.
Data: A : Accumulator Register 256 bits
Data: K : Key Register 256 bits
/* Load the Key */
K  data bus ; /* 256/M clocks */
/* Load the IV */
A data bus ; /* 256/M clocks */
while Encrypting Data do
/* Perform the Cipher Block Chaining Step while loading the
message text */
A = A   data bus;
/* 256/M clocks */
/* Execute 4 rounds of the block cipher */
A0 = K3  (K0 + A0) ; /* 1 clock */
A1 = K2  (A0 + A1) ; /* 1 clock */
A2 = K1  (A1 + A2) ; /* 1 clock */
A3 = K0  (A2 + A3) ; /* 1 clock */
for i = 1 to 3 do
if i = 1 then
left rotate A by 57 ; /* 1 clock */
else
left rotate A by 83 ; /* 1 clock */
end
A0 = K3  (Ki + A0) ; /* 1 clock */
A1 = K2  (A0 + A1) ; /* 1 clock */
A2 = K1  (A1 + A2) ; /* 1 clock */
A3 = K0  (A2 + A3) ; /* 1 clock */
end
data bus  A ; /* 256/M clocks */
end
Algorithm 7: QGBC-HP FPGA Algorithm
6.1.2 Experimental Evaluation of QGBC-HP
As with previous versions of the QGBC, the high performance variant has been
implemented in software and evaluated with the NIST-STS test suite[7]. As rec-
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ommended we encrypted the rst 50 KB of Beowulf[42]; creating 1000 samples,
each with a randomly generated key and IV. All of the samples were passed
through the analysis suite and PASS/FAIL results were tabulated (see tbl. 6.1).
Based on the suggested conifdence interval, we see that the QGBC-HP algorithm
passed all of the recommended statistical tests for randomness.
NIST-STS Test Success Rate Result
Approximate Entropy 980/1000 PASS
Block Frequency 991/1000 PASS
Cumulative Sums-Forward 994/1000 PASS
Cumulative Sums-Reverse 998/1000 PASS
FFT 991/1000 PASS
Frequency 994/1000 PASS
Longest Run 991/1000 PASS
Rank 991/1000 PASS
Runs 990/1000 PASS
Serial 1 992/1000 PASS
Serial 2 988/1000 PASS
Table 6.1: QGBC-HP NIST-STS Results
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
Through this exploration of quasigroups in cryptography, we have identied a
novel use of quasigroups, where we use polyalphabetic substitution to formulate
a block cipher. To this end, we have demonstrated the QGBC as a means of
enciphering plain text, as well as generating random data for use in an OTP
stream cipher. We have evaluated our cryptosystem with industry standard tools,
and performed algebraic and linear cryptanalysis of the system. Each time we have
found improvements and implemented them to create a stronger cryptosystem.
While work on this cryptosystem may never be considered complete, we have
demonstrated an array of uses and validations. Further work in this area would
be worthwhile, exploring projects such as:
Hardware test implementations Establish a ratio of throughput to gate count
in actual hardware.
Software throughput evaluation Benchmark the software data throughput
Improved QGBC with other cyrptosystems such as 3DES, Blowsh, AES
and others.
Additional cryptanalysis Further attempts with Linear Cryptanalysis can be
explored as well as Dierential Cryptanalysis, and other techniques.
The merit of further research in the QGBC cryptosystem will continue to
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establish the quality of the system and prove the cryptosystem to be a viable
means of protecting data.
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